



DESC

DOCUMENT EXAMINATION
SUPPORT CENTER

COLLECTIVE INSIGHTS INTO IRREGULAR MIGRATION IN SOUTHEAST ASIA AND SOUTH ASIA



*Emerging trends of
travel document & identity frauds*

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VISION

*Assist requesting Governments
in curbing transnational
organized crime and
preventing irregular migration
through capacity building
to support law enforcement agencies
in travel document examination
and verification*



Established in 2012, the Document Examination Support Centre (DESC) is managed by IOM's Regional Office for Asia and the Pacific in Bangkok, with the financial support of the Government of Canada & in close coordination with document examination experts of immigration authorities in Asia and the Pacific.



ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

The report on the ‘Collective insights into irregular migration in Southeast Asia and South Asia - Emerging trends of travel document & identity frauds’ is the first of its kind developed by IOM for Asia, as part of its initiative to strengthen migration management capacities in the region. The report falls within the sphere of a wider regional capacity building project, the “Document Examination Support Center (DESC): Phase III”, implemented by IOM’s Immigration and Border Management Unit of the Regional Office for Asia and the Pacific, with the generous funding of the Government of Canada’s Anti-Crime Capacity-Building Program (ACCBP).

The development of this regional report has been made possible thanks to the valuable contribution of the law enforcement agencies of the DESC countries, namely the 10 ASEAN countries, Bangladesh, the Maldives, the Republic of Korea, Sri Lanka and of the Canadian Border Services Agency (CBSA) in Bangkok, which all firmly believed that this analysis would be a critical source of information to foster regional coordination and information sharing as well as strengthen the capabilities of officers in passport examination and verification procedures.

Our deepest appreciation goes to the Asian Network for Document Examination (ANDEX); the Chairs of 2016 and 2017, Indonesia and Cambodia, respectively and the representatives of Members States, for their commitment towards achieving DESC’s goal of establishing a regular platform gathering experts to share information and best practices and more importantly to advance the development of regional trends in passport and identity frauds.

We convey our gratitude to the operational officers who provided first-hand information for this analysis. Their endeavour has been an eye opening exercise, revealing the strengths and identifying the challenges in data collection and management and reporting mechanisms, both nationally and regionally. Putting the data within a regional perspective also proved to be a demanding but rewarding exercise. As result of the consolidation of the DESC network and capacity building framework, we have produced a collective document which will lead the way for enhanced migration and border management in the region.

Last but not least, our sincere thanks goes to the IOM establishment of the Asia and Pacific Region; namely Maria Nnette Motus, M.D. the Regional Director, Chiefs of Missions and IOM staff of the countries of the DESC network, for the continued support and coordination to ensure the successful implementation of the DESC Phase III project outputs.

The Immigration and Border Management Unit
IOM Regional Office for Asia and the Pacific



EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

As a major outcome of the Document Examination Support Center (DESC) Phase III project, funded by the Government of Canada's, Anti-Crime Capacity-Building Program (ACCBP), this report aims to identify emerging trends in the use of fraudulent travel documents and in identity frauds, principally in the Southeast-Asia and South Asia regions; thereby, contributing to the wider objective of combatting irregular migration, including smuggling of migrants and trafficking in person. It also contributes substantially to the broader objectives of DESC in building sustainable capacities in passport examination and verification procedures, especially by intensifying the exchange of information, expertise, skills and best practices, nationally and regionally.

The analysis provides the concerned governments with evidence to make informed policy decisions and, more operationally, inform stakeholders about the capacity needs for future interventions in identity management to specifically:

- Make timely self-risk assessment to develop evidence based operational responses
- Evaluate the effectiveness of the current policy framework and/or inform evidence-based policy development
- Foster regional coordination and information sharing
- Assess capacity needs and tailor trainings in passport examination and verification

The report is a major step towards the achievement of the project goals through the development of a harmonized data set in passport verification with a regional perspective. The information in this report is based on data collected from DESC's two in-house systems; the Verifier TD&B and AFDRS (ANDEX Fraudulent Documents Reporting System), from the Asian Network for Document Examination (ANDEX); a regional platform of travel document examination experts and official document alerts.

The report's coverage extends to the following countries: Afghanistan, Bangladesh, Brunei Darussalam, Cambodia, Indonesia, Lao PDR, Malaysia, the Maldives, Myanmar, the Philippines, the Republic of Korea, Sri Lanka, Thailand, and Viet Nam. Most of the information used for the analysis was collected at airports. However, land Border Control Posts (BCP) and sea ports were also considered, whenever the information was available.

This paper deals with cases of fraud, defined for the purpose of this report as fraudulent travel documents and imposters. The data collected from a variety of sources, contributed to the richness of the analysis but also to some challenges in developing an overarching data set. To maximise the use of the information collected, data is presented for each country individually as well as on an aggregated level in terms of observations, covering the period from 2014-2017.



Based on this analysis, the results point towards a progressive increase in the detection and interception of imposters. However, the use of fraudulent travel documents was not of lesser importance, especially when related to biodata page substitution. With regards to gender, based on the data sample, more male travellers were detected indicating that most interceptions referred to male passengers, but this may also be due to a certain gender bias which is detailed in chapter 2.2.1. Further, the predominant age group of travellers intercepted, was between 18-30 years, and 31-45 years but explicit relationships between the type of fraud, gender, and age groups could not be made. In addition, principal routes taken by travellers detected, frequently led to Europe as an end-destination, often through Dubai, Doha, Malé, and Bangkok, as transit hubs. As far as nationalities intercepted were concerned, the analysis reveals that the majority of frauds committed were mainly by Iranians, Syrians, Sri Lankans, and Indians and in lesser numbers by some nationals of Western African countries (Cameroon, Nigeria, Ghana or Senegal), Bangladeshis and Chinese. Cases of fraud were mostly committed using Bangladeshi, Bulgarian, Malaysian, British and Indian passports.

Finally the report outlines the results of the capacity assessment undertaken within the scope of the DESC Phase III project, to monitor and evaluate the capacities of law enforcement agencies in travel document examination and verification procedures. Based on the project implementation strategy comprising an ongoing capacity assessment cycle, gaps identified were bridged by readapting activities and deliverables to address them. These included the production and wide dissemination of the booklet, 'Essentials of Passport Examination procedures', as a visual reference for a wide range of practitioners and also as a training and on the job mentoring resource and of the Verifier TD&B poster, providing step by step explanations of the use of the system. In addition, the travel document verification procedures, including the Verifier TD&B training package was updated to provide a more comprehensive modules, comprising more practical and hands-on topics. These successfully contributed to the enhanced cooperation with governmental stakeholders, thus expanding the general coverage of DESC.

In conclusion, this paper puts forward the challenges identified both in the trends analysis and the capacity assessment and the way forward for the region in undertaking methodical and standardised data compilation, adopting the Integrated Border Management approach, develop updated capacity plans and undertake technical advancements of the IOM tools. In particular, as the variety of sources and the inconsistency of the data collected proved to be major challenges, recommendations point towards ways of harmonising the data collected across the region with the IOM developed tools already widely used by the countries of the expanded DESC network, developing new generations of the Verifier TD&B and AFDRS, with adequate interconnectivity, internally, with IOM developed systems and externally, with external international systems. Conclusively, it is recommended to develop and operationalise Standard Operational Procedures (SOP), which incorporate the set procedures of travel document verification, taking into account the solutions mentioned and also expanding on roles and responsibilities, the intra-, inter-agency, as well as international coordination, reporting lines, access to tools and facilities.



GLOSSARY OF TERMS

ACCBP	Anti-Crime Capacity-Building Program
AFDRS	ANDEX Fraudulent Documents Reporting System
ANDEX	Asian Network for Document Examination
BCP	Land Border Control Posts
CO	Country Office
Counterfeit	A passport that has been entirely reproduced to imitate the appearance of a genuine passport
DESC	Document Examination Support Center
Fraud Case	Cases regrouping both fraudulent travel document and imposters detected
Fraudulent Document	Any travel or identity document that has been falsely made or altered in some material way by anyone other than a person or agency lawfully authorized to make or issue the travel or identity document on behalf of a State; or that has been improperly issued or obtained through misrepresentation, corruption or duress or in any other unlawful manner; or that is being used by a person other than the rightful holder. ¹
Forgery	Fraudulent alteration of any part of the genuine document. ²
Genuine	A passport obtained from the mandated authority, containing correct details of the holder and remains unaltered
Integrated Border Management (IBM)	IBM requires that all competent authorities work together in an effective and efficient manner. Cooperation should not be established exclusively within each country, but also across its borders, with relevant agencies of neighbouring States. Integrated Border Management seeks to address three levels of cooperation and coordination: intra-service cooperation, inter-agency cooperation and international cooperation. ³
ICAO	International Civil Aviation Organization
Imposter	A person who applies for and obtains a document by assuming a false identity, or a person who alters his physical appearance to represent himself as another person for the purpose of using that person's document. ⁴
IOM	International Organization for Migration
Land BCP	Land Border Control Post
Verifier TD&B	Verifier Travel Document & Bearer

¹ IOM Glossary on Migration 2nd edition, in accordance to (Art. 3(c), UN Protocol Against the Smuggling of Migrants by Land, Sea and Air, supplementing the United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime, 2000)

² ICAO Doc 9303: https://www.icao.int/publications/Documents/9303_p1_cons_en.pdf

³ 05-IBM Factsheet Integrated Border Management 2015, IOM

⁴ ICAO Doc 9303: https://www.icao.int/publications/Documents/9303_p1_cons_en.pdf



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INTRODUCTION

The present report on the ‘Collective insights into irregular migration in Southeast Asia and South Asia - Emerging trends of travel document & identity frauds’ was written within the framework of the regional Document Examination Support Centre (DESC) Phase III project, managed by the International Organization for Migration’s (IOM) and funded by the Government of Canada’s Anti-Crime Capacity-Building Program (ACCBP). The overall objective of the DESC Phase III project is to support governments in combating smuggling of migrants and trafficking in persons, through enhanced travel document examination and verification procedures. The results of this report aim at fostering an improved and shared understanding among DESC countries, with respect to trends in passport and identity frauds in Asia and to capacity needs in travel document examination and verification procedures, nationally and regionally.

This report is a follow up of DESC’s “ePassport Survey Report” of 2014 which provided an overview of the use of ePassports in the Asia and Pacific regions and the extent to which the functionalities offered by ePassports were being utilized. The main aim of the 2014 assessment was for DESC to gauge the capacities and needs of law enforcement agencies of the region, in terms of tools, knowledge and skills in passport examination and verification.

The 2014 Report gathered information on the biometric identifiers of the ePassports issued by countries of the Asia and Pacific region, on how these countries were implementing the ICAO recommendations on standards of ePassports and non ePassports, on the Border Management Information Systems (BMIS) and other technologies used, both in terms of software and hardware, and on how immigration authorities access and use the information in the chip for the purposes of border management and control. The purpose of the survey was, principally to tailor the Verifier TD&B to respond to the specific needs identified for enhancing the process of secondary level inspection of travel documents and travellers.

The important achievements of this initial DESC survey were the introduction of the Verifier TD&B to respond efficiently to the specific needs identified for enhancing the process of secondary level inspection of travel documents and travellers. Since, the Verifier TD&B has experienced an exponential growth, with thirty two (32) workstations operating in South East Asia and South Asia and, extending in 2017, as far as China.⁵ Moreover, by 2017, the system had established itself, both as a powerful border control tool and as an effective data collection mechanism. Hence, it was timely for DESC to pool its expertise, resources and data sources to broaden the scope of its deliverable by undertaking the analysis of trends in travel document and identity frauds and concurrently reassess the ‘status quo’ of capacities in order to identify emerging needs and continue to tailor its responses to specific requirements and contexts.

This report contributes to this aim by analysing emerging regional trends and patterns of irregular migration flows, through the lens of the use of fraudulent travel documents and imposters, paying particular attention to combining key variables on characteristics of people, such as gender and age and travel attributes, such as travel documents used and travel routes. Considering how unexplored the thematic area of travel document and identity frauds is and how patterns evolve systematically, this analysis provides valuable insights and opens the way for more comprehensive initiatives both for DESC and for law enforcement agencies.

The paper also presents the outcomes of DESC’s regional capacity assessment which formed an integral part of the DESC Phase III project implementation strategy. The aim was to make a thorough analysis of capacity enhancements required that would support the advancement of future trends analysis of travel document and identity frauds.

⁵ Verifier TD&B map page 18



CHAPTER I: APPROACH TO IRREGULAR MIGRATION TRENDS ANALYSIS

This section of the report first summarizes the applied methodology, before rationalizing the data sources underlying this analysis. The sources can principally be grouped as containing qualitative- and quantitative information. Based on the aggregated data, the results are discussed along the lines of travel document and identity frauds, the patterns of migration flows, characteristics of travellers and travel attributes.

I.1 Methodology


To provide this analysis, the data collected by DESC from different sources, was consolidated into an overarching dataset, comprising both qualitative and quantitative information, which allowed for the information to be processed in a structured manner in order to represent an overall picture of fraudulent travel documents and imposters, the patterns of irregular migration flows, and characteristics of travellers. Given the inconsistency of the data collected, mainly due to the variety of sources used to draft this report, it was challenging to develop a standard approach to the analysis. However, this pushed the DESC team to be innovative and to diversify the data and information mechanism and network.

Hence, the information presented in this report should be interpreted as tendencies and general patterns rather than as fixed or definite trends. By nature of the subject matter itself, the analysis of trends in travel document and identity frauds is a dynamic process;

these patterns are constantly mutating in the reality. Hence, it was important to adapt to new information and contexts throughout and, develop a flexible set of variables and consider various perspectives. In fact this approach enriched the analysis, especially, given that such little work had been done on the subject.

The harmonisation of the data collected across the region for the purpose of this analysis was only possible with the IOM developed tools used by the countries of the DESC network. This emphasizes the need, in future for a systematized data collection method and the provision of a consistent framework, which allows synthesizing the information. However, data and information was also collected, in parallel from the countries, individually which added to the variety, richness but also the challenge of disparity which DESC processed. Figure 1 shows the process used to develop and compile different data sets.

Figure 1: Visualization Data Processing



Source: DESC




As much as the integration of qualitative and quantitative data is challenging, crossing the bridge between the two methods provides a more comprehensive picture of current regional trends of irregular migration movements. In addition, referring to different resources and processes of data gathering can help DESC, as well as other stakeholders, to reaffirm known trends and discover emerging trends. The mixed method approach and the various sources

used provided DESC with the ability to triangulate the data for better reliability and validity of information (figure 2). This approach fosters a better understanding of (a) relevant sources to be used and (b) guides the analysis and presentation of data by means of several key variables, such as details on fraud cases (fraudulent travel documents and imposters), gender, age, travel documents used in fraud cases, and travel routes.

1.2 Sources

Overall the analysis is based on five different sources. They can roughly be divided into two perspectives: (1) sources with a quantitative angle, which are rich in terms of the amount of observation or cases and (2) sources from which different information could be retrieved, but that was not quantifiable. In addition, some information originates from primary data collection performed by DESC in support and collaboration with immigration agencies and officials (figure 2).

Figure 2: Visual summary of the applied mixed method methodology



Source: DESC




1.2.1 Verifier TD&B

The first source is the Verifier TD&B, a standalone system, which was developed by IOM in January 2014 and deployed in countries in the region as from July 2014, assuredly an easy and user-friendly tool for document verification. The system is used at secondary inspection level to assist law enforcement agencies to perform a wide range verifications and display useful results about the document and the bearer, to support decision making. The system is designed to read the Machine Readable Zone (MRZ) and the contactless chip in the passports and check a number of digital security features and to compare the stored biometric identifiers against those of the bearer. The system then generates a detailed report, containing information for further use based on specific regulations and/or procedures of each agency. Currently, the Verifier TD&B does not require integration or interoperability with other existing systems, nor Internet connection to be functional.

Countries, using the Verifier TD&B, share with DESC only the non-personal information of cases scanned with the system for the purpose of the trends analysis. Generally, data collected from 2014 to mid-2017, allowed insights into the number of travel documents scanned, the number of imposters, and the number of fraudulent travel documents detected only (figure 3). Yet, since the latest upgrade of the system in July 2017, the data that can currently be retrieved provides in addition to the statistics on the broad categorization


of the intercepted case (fraudulent travel document or imposter case), details on gender,⁶ age group and the issuing state of the passport used in the fraud cases detected (figure 4). However, there are some general limitations in the analysis and for the purpose of this paper, namely the categorization labelled 'N/A' (not applicable)⁷ as part of the particular variables could not always be taken into account.

Figure 3: Verifier TD&B Case Summary (2014-July 2017)



Source: DESC

Figure 4: Verifier TD&B Case Summary (July 2017)



Source: DESC


⁶ As defined by ICAO's Doc 9303 - https://www.icao.int/publications/Documents/9303_p4_cons_en.pdf

⁷ Information is registered as not applicable due to discrepancies with the MRZ and/or font type, among others of travel documents scanned



To date, the Verifier TD&B is installed in a total of 14 countries, at 31 operational sites and 4 training/research locations. The system is primarily installed and used at airports (25), and also at land BCP (6). The expansion of the geographical coverage of Verifier TD&B since 2014, including at airports in Asia and the outreach to land BCP, has considerably strengthened DESC’s capabilities to undertake a broader spectrum of analyses of irregular migration flows. This can be further consolidated, with future wider coverage, and spreading out to seaports and more land BCP.⁸ Information retrieved from the Verifier TD&B dataset provides the largest number of observations, and thus constitutes the biggest subset of data. In addition, for particular cases, countries provided in-depth insights on the fraud cases which have detected when a passport was scanned with the Verifier TD&B. Such details include not only the date of interception and the type of fraud case, but also, for example, comprehensive information on travel routes taken or intended to be taken, original nationality of the traveller, and the ostensibly fraudulent travel document used. Figure 5 shows the usage of the system in terms of total number of travel documents scanned since the first installation in 2014 to December 2017.

Figure 5: Usage (Total Scans) of Verifier TD&B



Source: Verifier TD&B (2014-2017)


1.2.2. AFDRS

The second source is the ANDEX Fraudulent Documents Reporting System (AFDRS), a web-based information-sharing platform developed by IOM in 2015 for ANDEX member states to share non-sensitive and non-personal information on fraud cases intercepted (figure 6). The subset compiled through the AFDRS offers in-depth insight into the specifics of the particular fraud cases intercepted, such as a detailed classification of the fraud case, including specific information of forgeries in cases where a fraudulent travel document was used, original nationality, if available of the passport bearer, as well as the travel document used at the moment of interception. In addition, users can provide any additional details of travel routes, including transits as well as any other observations. Figure 7 shows the number of cases entered between 2015 and 2017.

Figure 6: AFDRS Input

Source: DESC

Figure 7: Usage (Cases) of AFDRS



Source: AFDRS (2015-2017)


⁸ Verifier TD&B map page 18



Principally, the usage of these two underlying sources, the Verifier TD&B and AFDRS, both scaled up in 2017 (figures 5 & 7). With a total of 2,823 Verifier TD&B travel documents scanned and 46 cases input in AFDRS, the usage in 2017 reached a peak and was the highest than in any other year. This emphasizes the increased awareness of the importance of travel document verification and the use of related tools.

1.2.3. DESC Cases

The third source was based on cases of questioned travel documents submitted by countries of the DESC network between 2014 and 2017, requesting for technical advice as part of DESC's support to law enforcement agencies. Similarly to the AFDRS, these cases also provided specifics of the particular fraud cases intercepted, such as a detailed classification of the fraud case, including specific information of forgeries in cases where a fraudulent travel document was used, original nationality of the passport bearer, as well as the travel document used at the moment of interception.



1.2.4. ANDEX

The fourth source, ANDEX, a major body under the DESC umbrella, which fosters regional information sharing and analysis of trends, serves as an additional source of information. The information retrieved for the analysis was very various in terms of format and contents but was a valuable contribution incorporated in the analysis.



1.2.5. Official Document Alerts

The fifth source was the official document alerts received from DESC's international network of travel document experts from which information on travel document and identity frauds, especially referring to Asia was retrieved.



CHAPTER II: IRREGULAR MIGRATION TRENDS ANALYSIS & DISCUSSION OF FINDINGS

This section summarizes the main results of the fraud cases recorded across Asia into:


1. General findings on the frequency of the use of fraudulent documents and of occurrences of identity fraud.
2. Statistical summary of emerging patterns, regarding travellers’ characteristics.
3. Patterns of significant travel routes used by some nationalities.

2.1 Fraud Cases

Based on the categorization of fraud cases, the data indicates that the number of imposters progressively increased between 2014 and 2017. While between 2014 and 2016, the number of fraudulent documents intercepted clearly outweighed the number of imposters, the difference between the two types of fraud was narrower in 2017 (figure 8). The inclination towards impersonification rather than using a fraudulent travel document could be explained by the fact that the quality and security features of travel documents have been considerably enhanced and follow the ICAO standards of Doc 9303.⁹


However, based on data provided by the Verifier TD&B and the ADFRS, evidence pointed out that the relative number of fraud cases rather decreased from 2014 to 2017. In the initial years of data collection of 2014 and 2015, 30 per cent and 24 per cent, respectively, of all cases intercepted were fraud cases. However, in 2016 the number of fraud cases was reduced to 17 per cent compared to the initial years of recorded data (figure 9).

Figure 8: Documents scanned and examined across years



Source: Verifier TD&B (2014-2017) and ADFRS (2015-2017)

Figure 9: Relationship between Genuine and Fraud Cases




Source: Verifier TD&B (2014-2017) and ADFRS (2015-2017)

⁹ <https://www.icao.int/publications/pages/publication.aspx?docnum=9303>




Taking a look at a more detailed level, results revealed that the majority of all travellers intercepted between 2015 and 2017 intended to use a fraudulent travel document, with a total of 1007; while only 368 were imposters. Yet, numbers across the years 2015 to 2017, demonstrate the significance of the persistence of imposters, which almost doubled within that period (figure 8). However, continued monitoring of fraudulent travel documents should not be neglected and additionally AFDRS continued to provide information of the forgeries of travel documents intercepted, of which the major ones between 2015 and 2017 were 16 forged biodata pages and, at least 12 cases of counterfeit visa stickers or other travel documents (figure 10).

Figure 10: Breakdown of Fraud Cases



Source: Verifier TD&B (2015-2017) AFDRS (2015-2017)



Source: AFDRS (2015-2017)

2.2 Gender and Age Analysis

The upgrade of the Verifier TD&B since July 2017, considerably enhanced the capacity of DESC to undertake a more cohesive trends analysis, with the disaggregated data collected on multiple variables, which are gender,¹⁰ age group and passport used in fraud cases. Hence this paper analyses gender and age in relation to the type of fraud committed between the period July to December 2017.

¹⁰ As defined by ICAO's Doc 9303 - https://www.icao.int/publications/Documents/9303_p4_cons_en.pdf. However, for the purpose of this analysis, only female and male were taken into account




2.2.1 Gender

Results revealed that more male travellers were intercepted in fraud cases; 213 males, compared to 91 females in the ten countries using Verifier TD&B. The following assumptions can hence be made:

1. Male travelers are more inclined to commit frauds.
2. There may be a predisposition to target more often male travellers for further checks and secondary level inspection, due to the majority of officers operating at front line and secondary levels, being male (figure 11).

Figure 11: Gender Overview of Total Fraud Cases Detected




Source: Verifier TD&B (July-December 2017)

2.2.2 Age

Evaluating the distribution of fraud cases across age groups, of both female and male travellers, two particular age groups stood out: (1) 18-30 years (115 cases), and (2) 31-45 years (137 cases). In total, these two age groups constituted together 68 per cent of the cases intercepted, which leads to the conclusion that mainly young and middle-aged travellers are being intercepted in fraud cases. The general assumption

could be that people falling into these particular age ranges are more active and physically fit, hence more likely to take risks and seek better lives and economic opportunities, especially due to natural and/or man made disasters. Several factors may hence outweigh the risks of traveling with a fraudulent document or impersonating someone (figure 12).

Figure 12: Overview of Age-Groups of Total Fraud Cases Detected



Source: Verifier TD&B (July-December 2017)



2.2.3 Gender / Age

Out of the total of the 91 female fraud cases detected, the majority fell, almost equally, within the young and middle-aged age category; 18-30 years (29 cases) and 31-45 years (30 cases), accounting for 65 per cent of the overall female cases. Looking at the total of male fraud cases detected (213), the vast majority fell within the age category 31-45 years (106 cases), accounting for 50 per cent of the overall male cases. The other large male group was 18-30 years (86 cases). These results confirm prior findings of the analysis of age groups, that the most dominant age group examined were the youth (18 to 30 years) and middle aged (31 to 45 years). This detailed picture of characteristics validates the fact that young and middle-aged persons are seeking to cross borders irregularly. In addition, the fact that female interceptions were relatively equally distributed between 18 and 45 years might lead to the assumption that a much broader age group of active females than males are seeking to cross borders irregularly (figure 13).


This trend should be considered in the context of smuggling of migrants and trafficking in person, to which young girls and women are very prone to be victims of. Hence measures related to policies and procedures for travel document verification as well as trainings would have to be tailored accordingly, especially for operational officers to be sufficiently equipped with the right skillset and knowledge to be able to detect cases of smuggling of migrants and trafficking in persons.

2.2.4 Gender / Type of Fraud

As already discussed, the general tendency of imposters increased over a period of three years. This finding was especially confirmed with regards to male travellers. Across all intercepted fraud cases of male travellers, 118 were imposters, while 95 intended to travel with a fraudulent document. For females, there was a relatively equal distribution of frauds, with 47 fraudulent documents and 44 imposter cases.


While all fraud cases should continue to be monitored, with the visible increase in imposters, specific measures related to imposter recognition should be considered such as consistent information sharing (nationally and regionally) of patterns and profiles, enhancement of knowledge and skills in profiling and related specialized trainings (figure 14).

Figure 13: Overview of Gender distribution across Age-Groups of Total Fraud Cases Detected



Source: Verifier TD&B (July-December 2017)

Figure 14: Overview of Gender distribution across Types of Fraud Cases



Source: Verifier TD&B (July-December 2017)




2.2.5 Age / Type of Fraud

The distributional pattern of fraud cases between fraudulent documents and imposter cases across age groups was relatively equal. However, looking at all cases within the youngest age range (0-17), estimates clearly showed that more fraudulent documents than imposter cases had been recorded. This finding suggests that minors had increasingly been detected, while intending to cross a border irregularly, using a fraudulent travel document (figure 15). Generally, the assumption would be that for irregular movements of minors, networks of smuggling of migrants and

trafficking in persons strategically resort to the use of fraudulent documents rather than having a minor impersonate someone, most likely because minors may have difficulties to take on another identity for various reasons. For one, the imposter would need to be at the same development stage as the person being impersonated and have similar facial features. Secondly, the bearer of the passport would need to be knowledgeable about the information in the passport, if questioned, which might prove to be more difficult for minors when impersonating someone.

Figure 15: Overview of Age-Groups across Types of Fraud Cases Detected




Source: Verifier TD&B (July-December 2017)



2.2.6 Gender / Age / Type of Fraud

When combining the two predominant age groups (18-30 years & 31-45 years) and gender, with the type of fraud committed (figure 16), it is again confirmed that interceptions relate more to cases of imposters (144), rather than of fraudulent documents (107).

Figure 16: Overview of Gender across Age-Groups and Types of Fraud



Source: Verifier TD&B (July-December 2017)

■ Genuine ■ Fraudulent ■ Imposter



2.3 Overview of patterns irregular movements

2.3.1 Most frequently used travel documents in fraud cases


Out of the total number of travel documents, comprising 383, used in fraud cases, 215 were cases of fraudulent travel documents and 168 imposters.

The top five most frequently used travel documents in fraud cases were the following (figure 17):

- Bangladeshi, with 12 cases of fraudulent travel documents and 60 imposters
- Malaysian, with 22 cases of fraudulent travel documents and 11 imposters

- Bulgarian, with 8 cases of fraudulent travel documents and 21 imposters
- Indian, with 14 cases of fraudulent travel documents and 4 imposter
- British, with 5 cases of fraudulent travel documents and 13 imposters

Figure 17: Top 5 Travel Documents Used in Fraud Cases



Source: Verifier TD&B (July-December 2017)

The Bangladeshi cases confirm the trend of imposters being on the rise. With the Bulgarian cases, the assumption is that the end destination of travellers intercepted was Europe, seeking a better life.¹¹ To back up this tendency, throughout 2017, the Thai authorities formally incorporated the Verifier TD&B report,¹² as an integral part of their procedures when processing applications for visa on arrival, from bearers of Bulgarian passports. This process was established following repeated interceptions of fraudulent Bulgarian passports,¹³ used mostly by Iranian, Syrian and Iraqi nationals, with intended end destinations being European countries.

¹¹ See paragraph 2.2.2 above

¹² A PDF document generated by the Verifier TD&B when a passport is scanned, which provides technical details and description of the results of the verification: (1) visually, through screen shot of results, (b) a narrative of the technical details, and (c) manual inputs of findings and remarks based on your reporting needs.

¹³ Source: Thai Immigration Bureau



In the cases detected using the Malaysian passports, the number of fraudulent travel documents are twice as high as imposter cases and Thailand emerged as being an important intermediate and/or end destination, both, at airports and land BCP. DESC played an instrumental role in raising awareness of law enforcement agencies on this apparent regional trend, which led to the detection of several similar cases in Cambodia, Lao PDR and Republic of Korea – See ‘Case in point 1 - Fraudulent Malaysian passports: A regional trend?’

Case in point I - Fraudulent Malaysian passports:A regional trend?

SUCCESSFUL INFORMATION SHARING AT DESC EVENTS!


- In February 2017, in Bangkok, a Thai immigration officer shared his experience in detecting in the course of 2016 at Don Mueang International Airport, seven altered Malaysian passports used by an Iranian family.
- In March 2017, in Phnom Penh, a Cambodian immigration officer mentioned that a similar case had been detected.
- In August 2017, in Vientiane, the DESC immigration focal point shared the information of the interception of two Nepalese citizens at Wattay International Airport, travelling with altered Malaysian passports.

What: Secondary-level examination had revealed that:

- o Verifier TD&B results showed that ‘The chip exists but cannot be read’
- o Background printing of the biodata page was not printed in offset technique
- o Under UV light, security inks reacted differently from another Malaysian passport, known as genuine

Collective results

In July 2017, in Vientiane, during a DESC session facilitated by the Thai immigration officer who exposed the seven cases of the altered Malaysian passports, a Laotian immigration officer retrieved the data from the original MRZs visible only in transmitted light. This allowed the Verifier TD&B to access the chip of the seven passports, confirming that the pictures of the seven Iranian travellers were different from the pictures of the legitimate bearers because a counterfeit biodata page was stuck on the original passports






The majority of cases using the Indian passport were of fraudulent travel documents, with 80 per cent detected predominantly in Thailand and the others in Bangladesh and Myanmar.

In the case of the British passports, there was a definite trend pointing towards imposters being on the rise. Further analysis also revealed that 92 per cent of these imposters were detected in the Maldives.

Figure 18 below shows the breakdown, into fraudulent travel documents and imposters of these top 5 travel documents, used in fraud cases, into.

Figure 18: Top 5 Travel Documents Used in Imposter Cases and Fraudulent Documents



Source: AFDRS & Verifier TD&B (July-Dec 2017)



2.3.2 Travel Routes and Prevailing Nationalities

This analysis has highlighted the critical importance of identifying the routes and travel hubs, comprising, place of origin, transit and the intended destination, as determining factors to better understand irregular movements from, to, and within the Southeast Asian and South Asian regions.

The dominant routes identified in the analysis led to European end-destinations, taken primarily by Iranians and Syrians, travelling with European passports, and to a lesser extent by Sri Lankans, Indians, and Chinese. In particular Iranians and Syrians used Dubai, United Arab Emirates (UAE), and Malé, Maldives as major travel hubs. In the latter part of 2017, cases intercepted in Malé were also arriving from Doha, Qatar. In Southeast Asia, the predominant route seemed to be from countries of origin to destinations, both within Asia, through the land BCP between Malaysia and Thailand, taken primarily by Sri Lankans, Indians and Chinese. With the introduction of the Verifier TD&B since the latter part of 2016, at some of the concerned land BCP in Malaysia and Thailand, this trend could henceforth, be more closely monitored, with a wider data sample. Other nationalities which stood out are nationals of West African countries, such as Cameroon, Nigeria, Ghana and Senegal. For this group, South-East Asian destinations were rather of interest, with a remarkable number of complex travel routes, leading from and to Malaysia, the Philippines and Thailand and/or Thailand and European destinations (i.e. Germany and the Netherlands). For Bangladeshi nationals, who were intercepted, Canada rather than Europe appeared to be of importance.

The passport used in the fraud cases and the travel routes taken are crucial variables of such an analysis. The findings provide a wealth of information that can efficiently help countries to reflect upon some critical elements such as:

- Strengthening of capacities in travel document examination and verification procedures, in the areas of security features and profiling, among others.
- The strategic migration and border management policy direction required, especially in terms of information sharing and cooperation, considering the Integrated Border Management (IBM) concept.¹⁴

Figure 19: Overview of Nationals intercepted as Fraud Case



¹⁴ See glossary




VERIFIER^{TD&B}

Table 1: Overview of Verifier TD&B Users

Country	Location	Icon
Afghanistan	Hamid Karzai International Airport	
Bangladesh	Hazrat Shahjalal International Airport	
Cambodia	Phnom Penh International Airport	
	Poipet International Border Checkpoint	
China	Document Examination Center, Beijing General Station of Exit and Entry Frontier Inspection (2)	
Indonesia	Soekarno-Hatta International Airport	
Lao PDR	Luang Prabang International Airport	
	Thailand-Laos Friendship Bridge 1	
	Wattay International Airport	
Malaysia	Bukit Kayu Hitam Border Checkpoint	
	Kota Kinabalu International Airport	
	Kuala Lumpur International Airport	
	Kuala Lumpur International Airport 2	
	Kuching International Airport	
	Penang International Airport	
	Port Dickson Immigration Academy	
Maldives	Velana International Airport	
	Immigration HQ - Male	
Mongolia	Chinggis Khaan International Airport	
Myanmar	Yangon International Airport Terminal 1	
	Yangon International Airport Terminal 2	
Philippines	Ninoy Aquino International Airport Terminal 1	
	Ninoy Aquino International Airport Terminal 3	
Sri Lanka	Bandaranaike International Airport	
Thailand	Aranyaprathet Border Checkpoint	
	Chiang Mai International Airport	
	Don Mueang International Airport	
	Phuket International Airport	
	Sadao Border Checkpoint	
	Suvarnabhumi International Airport (Arrivals)	
	Suvarnabhumi International Airport (Departures)	
	Thailand-Laos Friendship Bridge 1	
Vietnam	Noi Bai International Airport	
	Tan Son Nhat International Airport	

Figure 20: Locations of Verifier TD&B Workstations





25 Airports, 6 Land BCP and 4 Training/Research in 14 Countries








Figure 21: Travel Routes Bangladeshi Nationals



Source: Alerts, AFDRS, ANDEX, Verifier TD&B Cases, DESC

(a) Bangladeshi Nationals

In contrast to other nationalities intercepted, estimates showed that the routes taken by Bangladeshi nationals appeared to be spread out, with a certain concentration in the Southeast Asian region and Thailand being the most relevant intermediate destination. Out of the region, their interest seemed to point towards Canada.



In terms of the type of fraud, the fact that there is no predominant type, but rather a combination of the generally frequently occurring ones, of imposters and use of fraudulent travel documents, with forgeries related to counterfeit visa and biodata page substitution, may indicate that Bangladeshis have a versatile approach in their irregular movements.






Figure 22: Travel Routes Chinese



Source: Alerts, AFDRS, ANDEX, Verifier TD&B Cases, DESC

(b) Chinese Nationals

The majority of cases intercepted were found to be using a fraudulent travel document, with a forged biodata page. What was remarkable was that all the questioned travel documents were 'Asian', with the Malaysian passport being the most frequently used. As for travel routes, based on the data sample, these were mostly within Southeast Asia, with Thailand and Malaysia as travel hubs and, outside of the region to Europe (UK) and Australia.





Figure 23: Travel Routes Indian Nationals



Source: Alerts, AFDRS, ANDEX, Verifier TD&B Cases, DESC

(c) Indian Nationals

A relevant trend observed for Indian nationals who were intercepted, was the importance of Thailand as an intermediate destination and as a major travel hub, prior to continuing their journey to destinations in Europe and Asia (mostly the Philippines and Indonesia), to Canada and the United States. However, whether all of these locations were the final destination or another transit point, could not be ascertained.




The most frequent fraud committed was the use of fraudulent travel documents, with forgeries related to bio data page substitution of passports of Great Britain, Portugal, Singapore, Taiwan Province of the People's Republic of China, and counterfeit Canadian, Filipino and US visa.





Figure 24: Travel Routes Iranian Nationals




Source: Alerts, AFDRS, ANDEX, Verifier TD&B Cases, DESC

(d) Iranian Nationals

Qualitative analysis pointed towards a relatively high share of the overall interceptions in the major Asian travel hubs, Bangkok, Colombo and Malé, being travellers of Iranian nationality. Looking particularly at the travel routes taken to the Asian region, their major travel hubs were Dubai and Doha. Another major travel hub which emerged was Istanbul, Turkey, but the sparse data did not allow more in-depth analysis in this report and will be pursued in future.

The intended end destination for the vast majority of these travellers were, some European countries, such as the United Kingdom, Germany and Italy, but also noticeably emerging intended destinations, being Albania and Austria.



All the cases intercepted had used European passports, predominantly as imposters and, in cases of fraudulent passports, biodata page substitution was the most frequent forgery - See 'Case in point 2 - Travel hub of Iranian imposters: A regional trend?'

Case in point 2 – Travel hub of Iranian imposters: A regional trend?

Proactive analysis of DESC!

Within July to September 2017, five cases of Iranian nationals arriving from Istanbul, were intercepted at Velana International Airport, Maldives. Based on the results of the Verifier TD&B, it was established that all five were imposters and had the intention to travel onwards to different destinations in Europe.

Where: Malé at Velana International Airport

When and What: 6 July 2017 –

- A female and a male passenger arriving from Istanbul presented respectively, a Greek ePassport and a French ePassport.
- Their behaviour appeared suspicious and immigration officers noted significant visual discrepancies between the passenger and the photo in the passport.
- Secondary level inspection established that both were imposters, intending to travel to Rome from Malé.

When and What: 1 August 2017 –

- A family of three arriving from Istanbul, presented three Croatian ePassports
- The immigration officer noticed that they looked Middle-Eastern
- Secondary level inspection established that they were imposters, intending to travel to Vienna from Malé.







Figure 25: Travel Routes Sri Lankan Nationals



Source: Alerts, AFDRS, ANDEX, Verifier TD&B Cases, DESC

(e) Sri Lankan Nationals

Another significant nationality of this trends analysis were Sri Lankans, mostly intercepted in Thailand and Malaysia, as imposters. Their intended end destinations in Asia were India, Indonesia, and Korea and out of the region, Canada and Europe (the Netherlands) were also important.



Additionally, movements at land borders should not be neglected and, as mentioned earlier in this paper, with the expansion of the Verifier TD&B at key land BCP, the data collected has enhanced this trends analysis.¹⁵ Within the fraud cases, using a Malaysian passport,¹⁶ a remarkable case was a Sri Lankan national intercepted at Bukit Kayu Hitam BCP (Malaysia-Thailand border), attempting to cross the border to Thailand - *Case in point 3 – Intricate travel routes: A regional trend?*

¹⁵ See chapter 1.2.1 Verifier TD&B

¹⁶ Case in point 1 - Fraudulent Malaysian passports: A regional trend?’

Case in point 3 – Intricate travel routes: A regional trend?

Expanding DESC's scope!

Where and What:

- 22 October 2017 at Bukit Kayu Hitam land BCP (Malaysia, border with Thailand)
- A male traveller presenting a Malaysian ePassport was intercepted when trying to exit Malaysia
- Initial profiling conducted by immigration officers revealed that the traveller could not speak any Bahasa Malaysia
- Secondary level inspection, determined that he was an imposter of Sri Lankan nationality

Outcome:

He had travelled by air from Sri Lanka to Singapore and had then been ‘smuggled’ by road to Malaysia, where he received a Malaysian ePassport as well as a Malaysian ID.





Figure 26 Travel Routes Syrian Nationals



Source: Alerts, AFDRS, ANDEX, Verifier TD&B Cases, DESC

(f) Syrian Nationals

The routes taken by Syrian nationals intercepted showed some clearly identifiable patterns. In the majority of cases, travellers went from Dubai to Malé, with the intention of using the island as an intermediate destination prior to continuing their travels to European countries, such as Germany, Italy, United Kingdom, Greece, or the Netherlands. Doha was also emerging as an important travel hub. The predominance of the major travel hubs of the Gulf region and the Maldives, with the end destination being Europe, is a distinct trend. Similar to the Iranian



cases, the travel documents used were all European passports, mainly French, but also Greek, Bulgarian and German, predominantly in cases of imposters and fraudulent passports, with biodata page substitution as the forgery.

Case in point 4 – Travel hub of Syrian fraud cases: A regional trend?

Proactive analysis of DESC!

Between October 2016 and September 2017, four cases of Syrian nationals arriving from Doha and Dubai, were intercepted at Velana International Airport, Maldives. Based on the results of the Verifier TD&B, it was established that 3 of them had used fraudulent travel documents and 1 was an imposter.

Where: Travel hubs in the Gulf region

When and Who:

5 October 2016, a male passenger, arriving from Doha, presented a French passport –
13 May 2017, a female and a male passenger, arriving from Dubai, presented French passports –

What:

- First level examination revealed low quality printing on the biodata page
- Secondary inspection level further established that all 3 were cases of biodata page substitution

When and Who:

21 September 2017, a female passenger arriving from Dubai presented a Bulgarian ePassport –

What:

- The immigration officer noticed that she looked Middle-Eastern, had an Arab accent and was nervous
- Secondary level inspection established that was an imposter, intending to travel to London.




Malé



Europe



Figure 27: Travel Routes of Nationals of Western Africa




Source: Alerts, AFDRS, ANDEX, Verifier TD&B Cases, DESC

(g) West African Nationals (Cameroon, Nigeria, Ghana, Senegal)

As observed with other nationalities (Indian, Sri Lankan, Iranian), West African nationals also used Thailand as an intermediate destination and a major travel hub, prior to continuing their journey to Europe (Germany, the Netherlands), Turkey, Canada, and other African countries (Cameroon, Ethiopia). Another pertinent trend, worth highlighting is the back-and-forth movement between Thailand and several European destinations (Germany and the Netherlands) and between Turkey and South East Asian destinations (Malaysia, Philippines and Thailand).



Similar to routes taken by Syrian and Iranian nationals, Doha emerged as a major travel hub to get to the South-East Asian region.






CHAPTER III: CAPACITY BUILDING ASSESSMENT: ePassport and travel document examination and verification procedures

Having a conspicuous capacity building role, DESC observes an ongoing capacity assessment cycle to monitor and evaluate the capacities of law enforcement agencies in travel document examination and verification procedures in order to provide contextualized support to its network of law enforcement agencies. As an integral part of the DESC Phase III project implementation strategy, this cycle, aimed to determine capacity enhancements required that would support the advancement of future trends analysis of travel document and identity frauds, highlighted in Chapter 2 of this report.

To this aim, throughout the period October 2016 to November 2017, the ongoing capacity assessment looked into the ways in which law enforcement agencies managed passport examination and verification, in terms of procedures followed, HR capacities, equipment and infrastructure and intra and inter agency and international cooperation and, how DESC can tailor its interventions.

The assessment targeted a wide range of officers actively engaged in travel document examination and verification procedures, ranging from frontline to secondary inspection officers, including users of Verifier TD&B, senior level decision makers and IOM staff of concerned countries. This was conducted in the form surveys, discussions, consultations and evaluations, both during DESC activities and from remote.

Figure 28: On-going DESC capacity assessment cycle



Source: DESC



3.1 Capacity Building and Training

The implementation strategy of DESC Phase III, focused primarily on tailoring planned activities to respond proactively to the findings of the ongoing capacity assessments and bridge gaps identified. The findings in 2016 and early 2017, revealed moderate awareness of DESC's range of support, limited usage of the Verifier TD&B, principally due to transfer of initial users trained on the use of the system and gaps in knowledge transfer as well as in technical knowledge and skills of frontline officers, leading to scarce referrals for secondary inspection.

Hence, DESC successfully broadened the scope of activities, which resulted into increased numbers of officers trained, usage of the DESC tools and technical support of IOM COs. The concrete outputs were apparent by the end of 2017, with the highest inputs received for Verifier TD&B, since 2014, with 2977 travel documents scanned and for AFDRS, since 2015, with 47 fraud cases reported, thus permitting for the first time a more cohesive analysis of trends, done in this report. Additionally, the baseline in terms of data collection and analysis has been set and DESC is now well positioned to further expand the scope of its capacity support with the continued collaboration of law enforcement agencies.

3.1.1 Essentials of Passport Examination Procedures

To this end, a wide dissemination operation was launched whereby DESC repositioned its deliverables to address this gap. The new DESC brochure was developed, in close coordination with ANDEX Members' representatives. The booklet was intended, not only as a visibility material but as a booklet comprising both information on DESC's support, as well as technical information on the passport and its security features, with pictures and short descriptions of security features. The booklet, titled 'Essentials of Passport Examination Procedures', was intended as a visual reference for frontline border control officers when clearing travellers, a working tool for shift supervisors, secondary inspection and visa and permit officers, among others and also as a training and on the job mentoring resource.

3.1.2 Verifier TD&B Poster

As a practical capacity building resource, a Verifier TD&B poster was published to address the challenges of job rotation and shortcomings in knowledge transfer to ensure the continued use of the tool for consistency and efficiency of secondary inspection. The poster was designed as a reference material providing step by step explanations, visual and descriptive, on how to operate Verifier TD&B, starting from setting up the connection, scanning passports, capturing photo and generating the report in four easy steps.

3.1.3 Travel document verification procedures: consolidated training package and diversification of profile of officers

An updated comprehensive capacity building package, comprising practical and hands-on topics, combining the main thematic areas of DESC Phase III, namely document examination procedures, information sharing and analysis of regional trends of fraud cases, was developed in January 2017 and further consolidated throughout the course of 2017. To address the recommendation of expanding the usage of the Verifier TD&B and reaching out to a more diverse audience, the training was extended to three days with a mix of presentations, demonstrations, discussions and sharing of experiences and best practices in travel document examination and verification procedures. The curriculum comprised the following modules:



- Verifier TD&B: Introduction and regional overview giving the regional dimension of the usage of the system as a regional tool to support the development of regional trends in travel document and identity frauds, the importance of information sharing, especially the Verifier TD&B statistics and cases of fraud detected.
- Document Examination and Verifier TD&B: Evaluation and discussion, allowing participants to present and discuss the results and benefits of the system, the capacities of officers in document verification and their challenges and how information is collected from Verifier TD&B and shared.
- Verifier TD&B: Demonstration and case study, an interactive platform for users to learn and demonstrate their ability to maximize the use of all the features of the software.
- Verifier TD&B: Reporting, allowing for group discussions on the effectiveness of the report generated and the use of the report within the institution.
- Trends in identity frauds and passport forgeries, facilitated by an expert of the institution and/or CBSA, giving the opportunity to all participants to share their observations and experiences from their respective locations.
- Standard Operating Procedures (SOP), on the cleaning of the Regula passport reader's sensor and on Visa scanning with Verifier TD&B, which provided guidance on a number of technical issues pertaining both to the system and equipment to ensure that users are fully equipped to manage their resources.

The profile of participants was broadened to include both secondary inspection and frontline officers, including supervisors, visa officers and relevant immigration training units, thereby attaining the objective of ensuring sustainability. Further, in addition to the IOM trainers, sessions were also facilitated by travel document examination and verification experts, nationally and regionally, including ANDEX Members' representatives, and CBSA experts.

Numerically, results of the assessment revealed the following:

- Over 80 per cent of respondents indicated that the system had considerably enhanced secondary inspection processes and highly contributed to enhancing understanding of imposter detection, paper and ink results, chip validation and examination of the biodata page under white light, infrared light and UV light.
- Over 90 per cent of respondents reported being confident in using the Verifier TD&B equipment and system, but still requested for ongoing practical training to ensure longer term results.

This was addressed by DESC, with the support of the respective IOM CO through additional remote practical sessions delivered by using the remote connection software already installed in all Verifier TD&B computers. Under the DESC Phase III, by December 2017, over 375 officers had been trained. Hence, the ongoing assessment cycle emphasizes the success of such an approach and also highlights the need for continuation (figure 28).



January 2017




December 2017



3.1.4 Communication and Coordination

To respond to the request for strengthened regional capacities in travel document verification procedures and for better understanding of regional trends and practical cases of travel document and identity frauds, DESC strengthened its coordination strategy, through regular communication with its stakeholders and the expansion of the geographical coverage of the Verifier TD&B to 35 locations¹⁷ and stepped up the contents of the Verifier TD&B Newsletter. A major success of this approach was also the high interest expressed by the Korean Immigration Service (KIS), the newest ANDEX Member since November 2017, in the work of DESC and the proposal to provide technical capacity support in future. Given the high standards of KIS, this would be a unique regional collaboration opportunity for DESC.


Figure 29: Overview of Verifier TD&B Workstations



Source: DESC

In addition, the expansion of the coverage and the increased usage of the Verifier TD&B as a secondary inspection tool was extended during DESC Phase III to land BCPs. As of December 2017, the Verifier TD&B was installed at six land BCP; three in Thailand (Aranyaprathet checkpoint, Sadao checkpoint, Thailand-Laos Friendship Bridge 1); one in Cambodia (Poi Pet); one in Malaysia (Bukit Kayu Hitam Land Border); and one in Lao PDR (Thailand-Laos Friendship Bridge 1).

¹⁷ Verifier TD&B map page 18






3.2 Equipment and Tools

The overview of the current technological developments and standards across the DESC countries regarding equipment used at frontline and secondary inspection, revealed the following:

- Countries equipped to read the chip of ePassports at primary line (figure 29):
 - o 39 per cent at airports; Brunei, Cambodia, Indonesia, Republic of Korea, Lao PDR, Malaysia, Maldives, Sri Lanka, and Viet Nam
 - o 26 per cent at seaports and/or river borders, ePassports; Brunei, Cambodia, Indonesia, Republic of Korea, Lao PDR, Malaysia, Maldives, and Sri Lanka
 - o 35 per cent at land BCP; Brunei, Cambodia, Indonesia, Republic of Korea, Lao PDR, and Malaysia

- That the referral process between frontline and secondary inspection was overall, not linear, due to gaps in clear cut travel document verification benchmarks, roles and responsibilities of the different offices.
- The need to assess the capacities of frontline officers to make quick determinations on results received and to streamline the referral process to secondary inspection.
- These above findings were similarly reflected in Chapter 2, which highlighted similar gaps which impacted on the trends analysis, hence, leading to the recommendation of developing the SOP, which would incorporate the set procedures of travel document verification and relevant training.

Figure 30: Countries reading the chip in the ePassport at Front Line



Source: DESC

Countries equipped to read the chip of ePassports at secondary line (Table 1):

With regards to secondary inspection equipment, the Verifier TD&B was the main system used by the vast majority of the DESC network, twelve (12) out of fourteen (14) countries. Additionally, all the fourteen (14) countries have access to the AFDRS. These confirm the significant regional impact of the DESC tools as the main data collection mechanism, providing standardisation both of data and capacities, in support of regional trends analysis. Hence, there regional baseline is already established and should be further consolidated in future by DESC.

Table 2: Secondary level inspection tools

	Bangladesh	Brunei	Cambodia	Indonesia	Republic of Korea	Lao PDR	Malaysia	Maldives	Myanmar	Philippines	Sri Lanka	Thailand	Viet Nam
Video Spectral Comparator(VSC)	✓		✓	✓	✓	✓	✓			✓		✓	✓
Magnifier and/or Microscope		✓				✓	✓	✓			✓	✓	✓
UV lamp		✓					✓	✓			✓	✓	
Passport verification system		✓	✓	✓	✓				✓			✓	
Biometric verification system			✓		✓								
Verifier TD&B	✓		✓	✓		✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓

Source: DESC



CHAPTER IV: WAY FORWARD AND RECOMMENDATIONS

We hope that this analysis will be an eye opening exercise for all stakeholders of the region and will contribute to build a regional standard for data collection and sharing of non-personal and non-sensitive information. This is a longer term undertaking, requiring a series of actions that will have to be undertaken both individually and collectively by all partners. The guiding and overarching principle which will support our collective objective is the Integrated Border Management (IBM) concept. This chapter provides a list of recommendations, although not exhaustive:

- Operational recommendations which address the findings of the trends analysis and aim at guiding stakeholders on measures to be taken to respond to the specifics of the fraud cases
- Strategic recommendations pertaining to the concrete measures, in terms of actions and policies that relevant partners should take to ensure a consolidated and comprehensive analysis of trends

4.1 Operational Recommendations

Several practical outcomes of the findings, allow for a direct translation into capacity building needs and tailored training programmes.

- In general, this analysis suggests that estimates point towards an increasing number of imposters detected. This tendency might be explained due to the considerable enhancement of the quality and security features of travel documents following the internationally recognized ICAO standards of Doc 9303.

Conclusively, it can be suggested that training should further be tailored and be more specific on profiling and imposter recognition.

- The vast majority of the intercepted cases were male. This might suggest that male passengers are more likely to commit travel document and identity frauds, but may also imply that more male travellers are checked because the majority of officers responsible for travel document examination and verification are male.

Hence it is recommended to:

1. Continue to pay attention to male travellers but also consider checking more female travellers, as per the SOP, which would incorporate the set procedures of travel document verification.
2. Deploy, as far as possible, more female staff in travel examination and verification units.



- The evaluation of the age of intercepted travellers revealed, that:
 - o 68 per cent of fraud cases committed by adults were within the age groups of 18-30 years and 31-45 years.
 - o Equal distribution of fraud cases for females within the age groups of 18-30 years and 31-45 years
 - o 80 per cent of all cases of minors (0-17 years) were intercepted with a fraudulent document.
 - o This information is considered as essential to better profile and detect fraud cases.

Hence these results should be considered to raise awareness of officers and considered within the SOP, which would incorporate the set procedures of travel document verification and more specific training on profiling, paying attention to the smuggling of migrants and trafficking in persons, to which minors, young girls and women are more prone to be victims.

- Moreover, the major passports used in fraud cases – namely Bangladeshi, Bulgarian, Malaysian, British and Indian passports – should be taken into account.

It is recommended to:

- Pay special attention to and evaluate these travel documents and their bearers.
- Raise awareness of officers and consider within the SOP, which would incorporate the set procedures of travel document verification.
- Share the specimen passports and disseminate relevant information to concerned officers.
- Consider relevant policy development to address this issue, in terms of information sharing, clearance procedures, including visa policies, among others.

- Asia is seen as encompassing complex movements as a region of origin, transit and/or intermediate destinations. The movements have highlighted the following:
 - o Thailand, the Maldives, and the United Arab Emirates are revealed as important travel hubs in the fraud cases intercepted
 - o Among the major destinations are Europe, the USA, and Canada.

It is recommended to :

- Pay special attention to these travel routes and evaluate these travel documents and their bearers.
- Raise awareness of officers and consider within the SOP, which would incorporate the set procedures of travel document verification.
- Consider relevant policy development to address this issue, in terms of information sharing, clearance procedures, including visa policies, among others.



4.2 Strategic Recommendations

4.2.1 IOM (DESC and COs)

(a) Next generation of data collection systems

Upgrade of Verifier TD&B and AFDRS to:

- Develop new modules in Verifier TD&B to better streamline current disaggregated data in Verifier TD&B and to align to standards of ICAO travel documents, in addition to the non-ePassport and ePassport
- Develop new modules both in Verifier TD&B and AFDRS for users to provide additional technical details of cases
- Develop new modules both in Verifier TD&B and AFDRS for multi-language translation into respective countries' national language
- Develop a secure online version of Verifier TD&B for interconnectivity with AFDRS
- Develop a data management and analysis mechanism and online system to provide instant and interactive trends in cases of fraud in the region
- Analyse the possibility of developing interconnectivity of Verifier TD&B with other internal and external secured data bases of international standards to provide a more cohesive system of travel document examination and verification



(b) Capacity building

- Support the development and operationalization of SOP (nationally and regionally) of travel document verification procedures addressing the following:
 - o Roles, responsibilities and reporting lines
 - o Travel document verification benchmarks and protocols, including, among others number of checks, roles and responsibilities and referral process, for different types of border
 - o Data management, including, among others data collection and information sharing, highlighting the use of Verifier TD&B and AFDRS as the principal data collection tools and information sharing mechanisms in supporting DESC to undertake the trends analysis
 - o Intra-agency and interagency cooperation, nationally and whenever possible international cooperation, in support of information sharing and of facilitation of the detection of irregular cross-border movements, among others
- Update the ANDEX Constitution, in coordination with Members to streamline data collection and sharing mechanisms
- Support countries to undertake targeted cross border initiatives supported by Verifier TD&B and AFDRS in terms of travel document verification and information sharing
- Expand the coverage of Verifier TD&B in the region (considering more land BCPs and seaports/river borders, based on needs assessment conducted)
- Coordinate with the Korean Immigration Service to collaborate on future regional initiatives and provision of technical capacity support
- Advocate for and support the implementation of the Integrated Border Management system in the region, paying attention to intra and inter agency and international cooperation and efficient management of processes, information and resources within agencies responsible for specific tasks.
- Continue to provide relevant trainings, awareness raising sessions and mentoring (on site and remote) in travel document examination and verification procedures, data management and analysis and more generally, on migration and border management topics, based on needs identified.






4.2.2 Countries

- Ensure the pivotal role of ANDEX in setting the standards for data collection and management and sharing of non-personal and non-sensitive information in the region
- Ensure consistent use the Verifier TD&B and AFDRS as the principal data collection and information sharing tools and provide relevant secured internet connections to facilitate exchanges
- With the support of IOM, undertake targeted cross border initiatives supported by Verifier TD&B and AFDRS in terms of travel document verification and information sharing
- Share regular information with DESC for the purpose of trends analysis
- With the support of IOM, adapt the Integrated Border Management concept¹⁸
- With the support of IOM, develop and operationalize SOP (nationally and regionally) of travel document verification procedures at different types of border
- Coordinate travel document examination and verification procedures, data management and analysis and more generally, migration and border management capacity building plans with IOM and/or other relevant stakeholders to ensure optimization of resources and capacities

¹⁸ See glossary






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